…unless we create voices for a radical change, the critical IT component of our acquisition system will be swept into the same bucket as weapon systems which are currently pushing toward more oversight…
As with all organizational activity, resource allocation is the most obvious power base (“he with the gold rules”) and the place where large amounts of organizational energy are applied. As a public organization that has commanded a large percentage of the Federal budget each year, the DoD expends a large amount of resources (people, policy, and oversight) to provide public transparency to DoD expenditures in order to assure Congress and the tax payers that public monies are spent wisely and properly. With the exception of a few well publicized examples, the Department has done an credible job of ensuring that public money is properly spent.
…our adversaries are exploiting most modern IT capabilities to support command & control, sensor information aggregation, and weapon control.
The DoDD 5000 is the cumulative result of energy spent to ensure that public monies are properly spent in the acquisition of DoD equipment and services. As argued in my previous post, defense IT acquisition challenges…, February 13 2009, although the DODD 5000 policy and oversight processes are working well to ensure that public monies are not improperly spent, there is a large chasm between “not improperly spent” and and wisely spent to achieve the needed result. In the case of DoD acquisition expenditures directed at the acquisition of information infrastructure I suggest that we are properly spending resources according to policy and procedures and failing to achieve an effective return on tax payer investment.
Arguments against the current process include:
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Not timely;
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Too much oversight;
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Long development and procurement timelines;
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Poor fielded functionality;
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Difficult to maintain; and,
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Long-term contractor dependencies.
Every new administration, as far back as my career spans (and that is a long time:-)), has vowed to clean up the DODD 5000 acquisition process. In turn, each Administration has:
1. Rewritten the DODD 5000 policy documents to modify philosophy, processes, and oversight activity;
2. Enforced the new policy with commensurate oversight process adjustments;
3. Improved acquisition workforce capability through training and billet allocation;
4. Modified contract philosophy between hard nosed fixed price contracting to more flexible cost plus contracting or some combination in between; and,
5. Placed more or less responsibility for management and delivery upon the contractor.
Although some might claim that the above adjustments have created useful outcomes, none have addressed the uniqueness and criticality of IT systems. To date we remain saddled with an ineffective IT acquisition and oversight process not valued by government, contractors, or the Congress.
For the Obama administration the concern over acquisition has become a primary National Security goal. In a recent Washington Post Article, Hill Panel to Begin Review of Defense Acquisition System, Monday, March 9, 2009; Page A13, staff writer Steve Vogel states:
“Last week, President Obama ordered a government-wide review of federal contracting procedures. In pledging to get a handle on defense contracting, Obama cited a Government Accountability Office study last year that found $295 billion in cost overruns among major Pentagon weapons programs.
This ‘wasteful spending,’ Obama noted, comes from investments in unproven technologies, lack of oversight and ‘influence peddling’.”
In a separate March 5th Aerospace Daily article John M. Doyle Obama Supports Acquisition Reform Bill, we see the preliminary suggestion of added bureaucratic oversight… once again:
“At a White House news conference, Obama praised the defense acquisition reform bill introduced by Sens. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.), the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee (Aerospace DAILY, Feb. 25)… …Among the reforms in their proposed Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act, one would require the Pentagon to conduct preliminary design reviews before giving approval to new acquisition programs.”
So once again we are headed toward a new round of DODD 5000 reforms and possibly a new law governing weapons systems acquisition. As in the past, unless we create a voice for a radical change, the critical IT component of our acquisition system will be swept into the same bucket as weapon systems which are pushing toward more oversight and slower acquisition time lines.
…I recommend that we parse this problem into at least two distinct and separate acquisition domains…
Rather than working to embed my thoughts into this “change” ritual to overhaul the macro DoDD 5000, I recommend that we parse this problem into at least two distinct and separate acquisition domains. The two primary domains would be: (1) weapon platforms & weapon systems; and, (2) information infrastructure and information systems/applications. My rationale for breaking acquisition into these two domains is driven by the distinctly different pace of technology change between the two. In the case of the weapons systems domain, technology change is less driven by rapid commercial technology change and acquired systems generally are fielded and sustained for 2-3 decades with engineering changes capable of supporting the needed evolution through system life cycles.
The information systems domain, on the other hand, has been tightly coupled to commercial information technology, with its 12-18 month technology evolution, since the early 1980s. As the DoD information systems moved from purpose built computer systems to commercial-off-the-shelf information systems our National Security became directly related to the advance of commercial IT. On the network front, DoD spent large amounts of money working to invent networking technology that would satisfy its various mission system needs, only to forgo those developments in favor of the DARPA invented Internet protocol based networks that are the heart of today’s commercial Internet revolution.
This is all of the good news. It is these commercial technologies that have helped us deliver precision weapons across large distances with stunning accuracy and effect. The bad news is that the very same technologies that the US is leveraging are available to our adversaries. Furthermore, our adversaries are not hampered by an acquisition system designed to ensure that billion dollar weapon systems are wisely spending tax payer monies. It is now evident that our ability to deliver rapid information technology change to the battlefield could represent the difference between success or failure in future military confrontations.
One doesn’t have to examine enemy tactics in recent attacks to know that our adversaries are exploiting most modern IT capabilities to support command & control, sensor information aggregation, and weapon control. One of the significant obstacles to early success in the Iraqi conflict has been the IED (Improvised Explosive Device) usually triggered with some version of information technology. The recent terrorist attack on Mumbai India demonstrated the ability of a small force to control a city through modern mobile phone, satellite phone, and computer systems enabled command & control. It will be egregious if we allow our adversaries to leverage commercial IT to defeat our own decision processes while improving their own.
The next post will suggest a practical and incremental way that we can demonstrate an alternate acquisition process for IT system capability.
Next week, DoD and industry thought leaders will be gathering at the Defense IT Acquisition Summit, Nov 12 in Wash DC to lay out the roadmap on how OSD will address the new NDAA directive to establish a separate IT Acquisition process. Secretary Bill Lynn will be kicking off the session with his perspective on how OSD will tackle this long running challenge. For years, the OSD leadership has tried to establish a “one size fits all” approach with the DOD 5000.02, making incremental changes every couple of years. Though designed to be a flexible process, the overseers never really wanted anyone to skip any steps unless signed off by DepSec.
My hope is that the new process does not fall prey to the NIH crowd who has prevented real change since 1996. If the rule of law is applied, especially the Clinger Cohen Act, the following success criteria would need to be established;
1) It must leverage real world industry best practices. BTW, the Defense Industrial Complex is not “industry” as defined by CCA. DoD need to learn from the successes and failures of multi-national giants like FedEx, Citigroup, Ford, BofA, GE to name a few who have a history of success.
2) It should take advantage of some of the agency innovative approaches that have delivered, like the AF Solution Assessment Process (ASAP), which completed the entire acquisition cycle in just four months.
3) It must follow OMB A119, that is to leverage existing process standards that have already proven to effective with IT. Not just standards for standards sake. For instance, OSD NII should recognize that the DODAF is a system engineering tool developed in the 80s for, you guessed, Weapon Systems documentation. After 25 years, it still lacks key elements including business view, performance metrics, solution view, and service component specifications. Sometimes, less is more, and maybe we should be looking at the OMB FEA reference models that more closely align with industry best practices.
4) The IT Acquisition process should not become another FFRDC product. Have we not learned from the “full employment act” methods like NESI, LISI, etc.
5) It should, as the DSB recommends, be modular and focused on delivering small, interoperable modules that have well defined interfaces in a services oriented context.
6) Also, as stated in the DSB, it should allow for continued user participation who understands the real trade offs and will likely help us all avoid “perfection” in leu of the 80% solution that can acquire at the “speed of need”.
7) And, the real litmus test will be, will the cost of doing the documentation exceed the cost of the solution. If so, it does not work.
My two cents. information on the Nov 12 Defense IT Acquisition Summit can be found at the new IT Acquisition Advisory Council web site; http://www.IT-AAC.org.
Cheers
Marv,
For the rest of the crowd, here’s the link to the Defense Science Board Report mentioned by Mr. Weiler:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2009-04-IT_Acquisition.pdf
Our pre-acquisition, Maritime Fusion & Analysis Services (MFAS, part of Maritime Domain Awareness) went through Gate 1 Review today (a successful endorsement, BTW). In preparation, DASN C4I brought us up to see ASD NII about options to move forward on an AoA prior to Material Development Decision in order to 1) inform POM 12, and 2) get a head start on determining the way forward for MFAS, e.g., new MDA PoR, become part of an existing PoR, etc. As we all know, if we don’t have enough information to make cost analysis evaluation by this fall for POM 12, POM 14 will be the next real opportunity for a new start.
ASD NII made us aware of this pilot program for new IT acquisitions and we will be evaluating it now that we have approval to move forward with a pre-AoA or BCA activity. The 2 yr+18 month cycle of the pilot is attractive in comparison to what we would expect as a DoD 5000.02 MAIS but we have more studying to do on the pilot process.
Joe,
Thanks for the link to the new DSB report and for the example of the potential of MFAS to move faster than our normal acquisition cycle. It will be important for pilot programs like this to help pave the way for a new way to acquire IT capability. I will talk about other pilot options based upon new network infrastructure security technology work ongoing in Pacific Fleet in the next blog post.
Marv, Your insights are right on target, which is why your contribution to the IT Acquisition Advisory Council will be invaluable. After reading both recent DSB Reports (IT Acquisition and Netcentric), my view of that the Defense Industrial Base is unable to fix itself is reinforced. Since the signing of the Clinger Cohen Act, which required agencies to leverage COTS and associated industry implementation best practices, I have seen little real change within either OSD ATL or OSD NII processes. They are still using MilSpec approaches designed for weapon systems platforms (with 20 year lifecycles) to buy IT infrastructure, business systems and information sharing solutions. The Services seems to know this, but unable to change the mind set of pentagon bureaucracy who hide behind their processes and are not vested in the success of the programs they oversee. Over the past 10, since taking the helm of the Interoperability Clearinghouse, I have seen huge resistance to change within the acquisition community, with few note worthy exceptions where leadership at the top forced change (AF, BTA).
Four years, one of the smartest acquisition guys I have met, David Tillotson, gave ICH an opportunity to rewrite the IT pre-acquisition process, making the Clinger Cohen Act actionable, via a project called the AF Solution Assessment Process (ASAP). Thanks to support from Mr. Wynne, Gen Peterson, Chuck Rieckers, Keith Seaman and Mr. Tillotson, we were able to overcome the many rice bowls and cultural impediments, proving that there is a better way. Cycle times for requirements alignment, capability determination and solution assessment were reduced from 18 months down to under 45 days. The formula for success was simple, dedicated leadership and a shared commitment to better outcomes. ASAP was applied 10 times with the same outcomes; actionable requirements, measurable capabilities, objective technology assessment, and an automated business case analysis approach.
Since then, this Method is being replicated for Navy CANES, USMC TRACOM, JFCOM MNIS, and BTA CAE, demonstrating a potential model for a new IT Acquisition Process. Thanks to Mr. Keith Seaman at BTA, this models is now being institutionalized with formal documentation, use cases and modeling tools that overcome the process gaps of JCIDS and the DODAF.
Now back to the DSB Acquisition report which recommends a separate swim lane for IT Acquisition outside the DOD 5000, JCIDS and the DODAF. Do we have the leadership in DOD and the resolve to tackle this problem. Will Dr. Ash Carter’s reform efforts be undermined by the same rice bowls that have inhibited a dozen prior reform efforts. For real change to occur, we must reward risk taking and small failures. Our DoD leaders must support the mavericks who have been beaten down over the years. We must highlight the cost of maintaining the status quo, which is estimated to be over $20Billion per year in IT failures and cost overruns. We must holder our suppliers accountable with well defined Serve Level Agreements.
The US cannot dominate or win in Cyber space unless we fix these process and cultural problems. We must reward innovative thinkers and embrace our critics. We must embrace the innovators and change agents who have long been black balled in the past.
Marv,
Thanks for including me in your mail group. I am flattered. I would like to remind the group of some recent events that provide additional urgency to the subject of this blog. Both SECDEF and SECVA, as well as the President now, have announced their committment to create a single, life-long, virtual eRecord for every service member/veteran, spanning their lives from entry onto active duty to internment. In addition, both Secretaries have committed to SOA as the strategy.
I offer to the group that this has now created a “macro-use case”, if you will, from which we now need to derive subsidiary use cases, business models, the abstracted SOA meta-models, and allocate work to build these services to DoD and VA.
While all posts above are quite thought provoking, those of Todd Carrico, Ph.D., resonate most with me WRT this new direction set by the President and both Secretaries. To attempt to expand pon Todd’s comments (not sure i am qualified to do so, but here goes anyway…) it might be useful to think about information resource management from the perspective of the Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA). The FEA is simple in concept, and not to difficult to use to explain IT investments to senior leaders, showing graphically the linkages (“value chains” or “mission threads”) that start at the very top (the PRM) and extend to the very bottom (the TRM), with connections through the BRM, SRM, and DRM.
We certainly need to move away form platform-based thinking, and the stove-pipes thereby created. In addition, we need to move toward resourcing and building common services (really common, i.e., with multiple consumers) with tight control of interfaces.
VA and DoD have now stood up the InterAgency Program Office to facilitate this work. Architecture (as a process and a product) will be a significant responsibility for the IPO.
I would appreciate your thoughts. If we think this through together, we can come up with a really strong concept of IRM suitable to the challenges now laid in front of us.
Tnx…
PT
Paul,
Thanks for the good comments and for raising the IQ of this great group of thinkers. I agree that Todd has it mostly right and because he and you are commenting on the rapidly changing capability and agility being created by new technologies (primarily virtualized computing, more network ubiquity, and service based software that relieves the burden of creating application foundation code). I believe that it is this technology change that will overshadow our current outdated oversight practices and allow us to more quickly build and field new functional capabilities in future DoD IT systems. What I would like to see happen, while these technologies are maturing, is for DoD to begin to pilot some rapid IT capabilities. Further to your and Todd’s points, is that fact that we are quickly getting to an era where the acquisition professionals like ourselves will spend the majority of our efforts building layers of enabling infrastructure tools which allow operational users to create the applications that best meet their needs, not unlike you and I build powerpoint slides using the Microsoft or other slide builder tools. The hardest nut to crack for this rapid user interaction is the security challenges.
Marv,
Much of the debate for oversight and execution of MAIS as a separate stovepipe is documented in GAO reports, Grace and Packard commision. GAO reports documents history of DoD directives and policies for execution and oversight and implementation.
1. I would suggest reading ” TIdes of Reform ” by Paul Light for larger context of governement reform.
2. Services and DoD, suffer from NIH and are not willing to give up equity. Also system is not set up to incentiveze OSD staffers to gain “buy-in” with services. It is too easy to opt our of exercising “checks and balance” and results in argument by position of authority. Leads to strong centralized decision making ( dangerous). No “wisdom of the crowds” here.
3. Current Acquisition talent pool has a tough time delineating execution vs oversight and at what levels this should occur. Also what took five years to tear down will take three times to build back up. Current system will find it hard to compete for “millenial ” genration talent. We will have to appeal to ” service to government” and provide good on board and off board experiences so we can catch them again later in their career.
Probably want to look at how we provide good experiences for younger generation coming up. Emphasis should be place on leadership pipeline ascension ( instilling good values) vice throwing more SESer/Flags at the problem.
4. Do believe there is merit in creating “Esprit de Corps” and reaching a “tipping point” / going viral to infect the rest of the Acq professional community.
5. Suggest your forum gain wider audience in DAU forum.
Gary,
Great comments and a useful discussion on the human resource component of this issue. I believe that we will see much more of an inflow and outflow between industry (at least DoD related industry) and government which I view as generally better than the golden handcuffs structure that the older retirement system created. I think it is still true that young people can get more responsibility at an earlier age in government than industry which is a good reason for them to spend time in government at a young age and then move out for mid career years, and possibly back in during late mid career years. All good reasons for this to be worked harder.
Marv,
I worry about this particular solution because everyone is currently trying to carve off “their” area as “special.” I believe nearly everyone accepts the current system has all the problems you have identified which have not been solved by many very good political appointees who have tried. In thinking about this over the last couple of years, I have concluded that the answer lies not in the process, but in the talent of the individuals who are doing acquistion — not in the talent of the politicals, but in the talent of the military people the Services assign to acqusition.
I believe that nearly any problem can be solved by the application of sufficient talent. Concurrently, we are not going to make a lasting difference in acquisiton by subdividing one area off and “saving it.” We need to force the Service Chiefs to put in sufficient talent to address their long-standing issues and be able to solve their own problems day-to-day. Specifically, we need five changes:
1. An Acquistion qualified 4-star in each service (USMC 3-star deputy) with the associated staff,
2. Double the number of acquisition flags,
3. Double the number of acquistion SESs,
4. Manage acquisiton civilian careers (training, promotion and duty assignment) the same way as officers (by AT&L)
5. Establish a system of Acqusition “mentors.”
Best regards,
Dave
Dave, Thanks for taking time to add your thoughts to this discussion. As you know, I always value your ideas. I take your point about carving off pieces as a non solution in the larger sense. I hadn’t thought about the ideas you have added (adding more talent to the system) because I see a lot of people around me toiling at the onerous processes we have institutionalized under our DODD 5000 banner. Having grown up in the AEGIS Wayne E Meyer program office I do understand the value of a strong program structure, strong mentoring, and many rungs on the learning ladder before one reaches the top of the system. In reflecting back on that experience I can relate that your suggestions would help push us closer to having more talent to create those special program offices.
That said, I can’t help but feel that we are spending too much money on excessive oversight for our acquisition. I could apply my model and ideas to the entire system but my focus has been on IT and C4I so I wasn’t trying to bite off the full problem. I will mull on this further and see how this feels a couple of days down the road:-)